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ism, or else acknowledge to the possibility of a new creation. We do not mean the creation from a divine agency, but we mean the coming into existence of a new being, a new product, which was not contained in its causes and which has no resemblance to its causes. The supposition is one which scientists do not like to entertain. It appears too "unscientific." It does not agree with their methods. But they must at any rate put the fact of consciousness in unison with their general theories. But that is something which they appear neither inclined nor able to do, and in that case they cannot themselves be called true scientists.

CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF PROFESSOR DR. KUNO FISCHER, BY W. S. HOUGH.

CHAPTER III.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF DEVELOPMENT.

I. The Kantian Ground-Problems.

The fact that we conceive a common world of sense was the first problem; its solution constituted the theme of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge. If this world of sense were not completely phenomenal—*i. e.*, conceivable and conceived—that fact would necessarily have been recognized as inexplicable. Objects of sense are appearances or phenomena. In order to explain the latter, three questions have to be answered, which virtually involve Kant's fundamental problems. Firstly, there must be a *subject*, to which anything objective could in general appear, and without which no sort of phenomenon would be possible. The question is: *Who* (what) is the knowing subject? Secondly, there must be an *essence*, which constitutes the ground of all phenomena, and of the knowing subject itself, provided the latter does not create wholly out of itself the things it conceives. In this case the knowing subject would at the same time be the ground of being of all phenomena. But since this is not the case, it must be asked:

What is that substratum which is the ground of the knowing subject as well as of the entire phenomenal world? Thirdly, between this substantial ground and everything resting upon it there must subsist a relation which determines the nature of the forms and objects of knowledge (phenomena) peculiar to us, and which, if it lie within our comprehension, explains them. The question is: *Why* the nature of our knowledge, and the nature of things, is constituted as it is, and not otherwise? The three problems may be summarily designated by their initial words, Who? What? Why?

The first question is solved by the "Critique of Pure Reason" by its investigation of our faculties of knowledge, and by its doctrine, that the sense-world originates from the material elements of our impressions and the formative elements of our perceptions and notions. The second question Kant answered by his differentiation of phenomena from things-in-themselves. What the latter are the "Critique of Practical Reason" shows by its doctrine of freedom and the moral order of the world, and the kindred and accordant doctrines of God and immortality. The third question is regarded by Kant as incapable of solution, owing to the constitution of the human faculties of knowledge. If the relation of things-in-themselves and phenomena were an intelligible relation, the first cause of things, and therefore their primal origin, the timeless creation, would be known, and the riddle of the world solved. But this relation remains unknowable, the inner nature of things unsearchable, the mystery of the world still a mystery. Of these unsolvable problems there are three: the cosmological, the psychological, and the theological.

If the intelligible character of the world consists in freedom, then it is the *will* which determines the peculiar constitution of our knowing sensuous reason, as well as the peculiar nature of phenomena, and upon which they both depend. *How* this is possible is the question which comprehends in itself the secret of the world. Kant rightly grasped and rightly stated this question, but he declared an answer to it to be impossible. Schopenhauer claims the honor of having found the only true answer, and of having solved by his own doctrine the problem which Kant merely discovered.

The psychological and theological problems are rather subor-

dinate to, than co-ordinate with, the cosmological, since they contain the same problem applied in the one case to human reason, and in the other to human character. The psychological problem is concerned with the nature of our knowing faculties, in the constitution of which sense and understanding are at once distinguished and united, as is indicated in Kant's question: "How is external perception—namely, that of space—in a thinking subject in general possible?" If we call the thinking subject *soul*, and our outward manifestation *body*, the psychological problem involves, in this its true conception, the old inquiry concerning the relation or community of body and soul. The theological problem is concerned with the fact of our moral disposition, with the relation of our intelligible to our empirical character, or with the way in which freedom and necessity consist together and are united in our moral conduct. To all these questions Kant held that it was impossible for any one to find an answer; that, in short, they are and remain incapable of solution with the means of our *theoretical* or scientific knowledge.

The fundamental inquiry has to do with the relation between things-in-themselves and phenomena, or, what is the same thing, the relation between freedom and nature, between the intelligible and the sensible, the moral and the material orders of the world, or between the causality of will and mechanical causality. The unification of both lies in the principle of natural adaptation, and the teleological view of the world based upon it—a view which by no means lays claim to the validity of scientific (theoretical) knowledge, yet claims, nevertheless, the character of a necessary and indispensable criterion of judgment. But the idea of immanent ends in nature is so intimately connected with the idea of natural development that the two are inseparable. That which develops itself must develop itself to something—*i. e.*, self-development implies the necessary actualization of an inherent end; and whatever has such an inherent end, or implanted tendency, which strives for realization, must, in the very nature of things, develop itself. In the notion of natural development, therefore, final and mechanical causality, will and mechanism, freedom and nature, thing-in-itself and phenomenon, unite themselves. We accordingly take Kant's doctrine of development as the unification of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom.

II. The View of the World as an Historical Development.

1. The Natural Development.

If we compare the pre-critical inquiries of our philosopher with the "Critique of Reason" and with the views that grow out of it, we find one fundamental thought permeating the ideas of both periods; it is Kant's view of the world as an *historical development*—a view which was by no means denied nor prejudiced by the "Critique of Reason," but, the rather, more firmly established than had been possible before. Since the subject of such a view of the world is nothing other than the natural world-changes, or the time-succession of different states of the world,—which are connected according to the law of causality, so that the later necessarily follow from the earlier—the development of things coincides with their *natural history*, which is something entirely different from the customary *description* of nature. This contents itself with artificially classifying things, with grouping their external attributes, and with describing *what* they are in their present state. Natural history, on the other hand, explains *how* things originated and have become what they are, what changes and transformations they have undergone in the course of time, how and under what conditions the present states have grown out of the previous ones. Such a natural history of the world Kant missed in the scientific knowledge he found at hand, and he demanded that it be attempted as a new and bold problem, the solution of which must be ventured. He himself led the way by his own example, founding with his "General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens" this new scientific account of the world. His short geological treatises, together with his physical geography, may be regarded as contributions to the natural history of the earth, while his two treatises on the human races are rightly designed to be contributions to the natural history of man. "It is *true philosophy*," said Kant, "to trace the diversity and manifoldness of a thing through all its history."¹

2. The Intellectual Development.

The "Critique of Reason" teaches how phenomena, the sense-world, and experience originate from the conditions of our repre-

¹ Kant, "Physische Geographie," Introduction, § 4. Part II, Sec. I, § 3.

sentative nature, how experience grows and becomes increased, and how it systematizes itself, as in accordance with the regulative ideas of reason it strives toward a scientific system of knowledge, the final goal of which, were it attainable, could be nothing other than the completely intelligible *system of development* of the world. If we follow out the investigations of the "Critique of Reason" in the development and progress of its results, and see how it makes phenomena or objects originate from our sensations and the form-giving capacities of our perception and thought, and experience originate from the synthesis of phenomena, and systematized experience—*i. e.*, science in the progressive development of its various departments, or the *history* of the sciences—originate from the co-ordination of experiences in accordance with the regulative Ideas, we see that the problem and results of the "Critique" cannot be more concisely and aptly summed up than in the designation we have chosen; it is the doctrine of the origin and development of human knowledge. In every development the stadium reached, or the state which has become, is always in its completion the condition, the material, the beginning of a higher form. This is also true of our states of knowledge. Impressions are the material out of which phenomena are formed, phenomena the material for experience, experiences made the material of actual experimental knowledge. Thus the states of knowledge, the origin of which the "Critique" teaches, are the *states of development* of knowledge.

3. The Social Development and the Development of Culture.

The natural history of man is the condition and the material of the history of his freedom. The natural and intellectual development serves the moral, which does not merely, so to say, continue the former on a higher plane, but subordinates it and makes its development subservient to its own. The progressive development of our natural and intellectual capacities shows itself, in this service of freedom, as human *civilization*, or, as the history of culture and the nature of civilization, is, according to the view of Kant, such that it is involuntarily impelled forward from the natural ends and interests of man to the fulfilment of the law of freedom, but that it is only completed by the Idea of freedom itself. Moral freedom can only develop itself as historical culture and the his-

tory of culture can complete itself only when its highest goal is striven for with the clearest knowledge and purpose. Then the laws of freedom will not be blindly fulfilled, but fulfilled *with freedom*. In order that the capacities of human nature receive full development and attain their natural ends, the antagonism of interests, the competition of powers, the division of labor, discord and the struggle for existence, must enter into life; there must be an advancement from the isolated state of life to the social, and from barbaric freedom to social and civil freedom, where the conflict of interests, to be sure, continues, and, with the increase of our wants, becomes more complex and more intense, but without that reciprocal destructiveness and the endangering of existence and freedom. For the *full* unfolding of capacities is only possible under the condition of the *security* of life. Security belongs to the natural ends of life, hence social union and public law and order must be sought and attained in the highest form possible. That form is the *constitutional government*. But even the constitutional state remains so long insecure, as well as the existence of all individuals and the development of all interests of culture, as states and peoples still exist in a condition of barbaric freedom, warring with each other to their mutual destruction. Consequently the natural ends of life, or the needs on the part of man of security, demand not only a civil, but an *international* law, the securest form of which is a federation of free, civilized, and constitutionally governed peoples.

4. The Moral and Religious Development.

But freedom is only actualized and, as it were, embodied in a moral state of the world, when it is striven for, not on account of the security of life, but for freedom's *own sake*, and with those means which are the factors of freedom itself: these are not the mechanism of our inclinations, but conscious purpose, ethical knowledge, and moral disposition. Kant, accordingly, demanded that the necessity of a confederation of nations, with a view to establishing lasting peace, should not be proved merely by the interests of security and civilization, but that it should be placed upon moral grounds, and held up to view as the moral end of the world, and that in this spirit of world-citizenship the universal history of man should be written. In order to show that "the evo-

lution of a form of government based upon natural right" lay in the plan of the world's history, Kant appealed to the enthusiasm and intense interest with which all civilized nations greeted the attempt of the French to found a government of natural rights. And he saw in his own epoch the rise of individualism in thought and knowledge—"the age of enlightenment," the goal of which could be nothing other than an intellectual and morally enlightened age of the world, which should be permeated through and through in its culture with the Idea of freedom.

But the moral development by no means goes hand in hand with the progress of our culture and our external social civilization. On the contrary, the more complex human society becomes, the more it suffers internal disruption, the more it develops the inequality of individuals in the circumstances of life, the more it arouses and fosters motives of self-seeking, and allows contention and hateful and evil passions, this "offspring of lawless dispositions," to grow without bounds. It is because such enormous vices as ingratitude and hatred, jealousy and malicious pleasure, ill-will and calumny, flourish and luxuriate in the very bosom of society, that the latter needs to be transformed and purified in its very core, needs a complete regeneration, which not "the juridical," but only "the ethical state," hence not the State, but only the *Church*, as the moral kingdom of God on earth, is capable of bringing about. Here the sinful natures, out of which all those evils spring that men intentionally bring upon one another, are to be rooted out, and men's hearts purified, in order that good-will may reign in the world. The establishment of such a kingdom of God upon earth is necessary for the solution of that most important of all problems—*man's salvation*—and it is consequently recognized by Kant as a duty of mankind to itself, and in this respect as *sui generis*. The fulfilment of this duty constitutes the special theme of the *religious development*, the true problem and goal of which first found its historical expression in the appearance of Christianity, and which needed in the development of the visible church constant rectification, in order not to become fixed in outward, lifeless forms, and lose sight of the real essence. To true faith there belongs that veracity which is identical with sincere conviction based upon moral self-knowledge. Nothing contradicts religious belief more than hypocrisy, which is the offspring

and companion of compulsory faith. Hence Kant regarded the religious *Aufklärung*, owing to its principle of tolerance, as an essential feature of the *Aufklärung* itself, and its time as a necessary stage of reform in the history of the church.

The manner in which Kant apprehended the relation of religion and revelation, of the invisible and the visible church, may serve as an excellent illustration of his doctrine of development in general. He, like Lessing, regarded revelation as the religious education of mankind, the visible church as the form of manifestation and development of the invisible; and he laid great stress upon the just appreciation of these historical, formative stages, since it is quite as mistaken to consider them worthless and superfluous as to hold them to be the essence of religion, or its immutable forms. And just as the visible church is related to the invisible, so our natural and social history is related to freedom and the final moral end of man, and our sense-life to our intelligible being, and the sensible world to the moral.

III. The Teleological View of the World.

1. The World-development as Phenomenon.

We see how the Kantian philosophy presents itself in its entire view of the world as *doctrine of development*. It regards nature and freedom, culture and the state, religion and the church, as historical developments; and, although it has not elaborated these subjects, but only sketched their main features and general outline, yet it had already seized upon the problem of such a view of the world before the "Critique of Reason," and has established it by means of the latter.

The laws of world-development are partly laws of nature, partly laws of freedom. The first consist in the laws of motion of the material world, in the causality of objective and subjective changes, in the necessary time-succession of world-states; the second, in the moral end of reason, from which follow those objective and subjective laws of freedom which are to be fulfilled in the development of culture and of the state, of religion and of the church.

In the pre-critical period Kant's views of development were confined to natural history, and especially to the mechanical origin

and transformations of the cosmos. Nevertheless, he declared, even at this time, that the origin of *organic* bodies could not be comprehended after mere mechanical laws. The inquiry concerning the *knowableness* of natural changes, or of the causal nexus of things, lay still remote from him when, in his "General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens," he set forth his mechanical cosmogony. He took the world and its laws as given, and left unconsidered the way in which they become known to us. The thorough investigation of this question—namely, that concerning the causal nexus of things—necessitated him first to abandon the way of rationalism, then also that of the old-school empiricism, and to set out upon the entirely new path of the "Critique of Reason." This brought the solution: it discovered how, in accordance with the constitution of our reason, phenomena, and their necessary synthesis—the sense-world as constituted by natural law (nature)—originate out of the material of our impressions and the laws of our thought (sense and understanding). We are obliged by the nature and laws of our reason to conceive the material universe in a mechanical development, the realm of animal life in an organic development, and mankind in a moral development. And, since all these orders of development contain nothing that might not be conceivable and conceived, the entire world-development is through and through phenomenal. Its laws are laws of nature and of freedom; both are necessary ideas of our reason; those condition the sensible, these the moral experience. Hence, also, the history of nature and freedom—*i. e.*, the entire world-development—has the character of idea or phenomenon. And what else could it be, since all stages of evolution, of whatever sort they may be, are successive, or constitute a *time-succession*, hence must take place in time, which, as a pure form of thought, can itself contain only ideas or phenomena?

2. The World-development as Teleological Phenomenon.

The notion of phenomenon, however, is necessarily apprehended much more profoundly in the doctrine of development than in the doctrine of knowledge. As objects of our experience or scientific knowledge, phenomena may not be thought as referred to *ends*; as forms of development, on the contrary, they cannot be conceived apart from the idea of ends. Whatever evolves itself must

evolve itself into something ; it bears its own determination within itself, and manifests the character of self-determination and freedom. If we compare phenomenon as object of knowledge with phenomenon as state of development, we see that the difference lies in the conception of *immanent teleology*, which is excluded in the former and comprehended in the latter. And, indeed, the idea of inherent, final causes as operative in phenomena must be applied to the entire world-development ; not merely to the organic and moral development, but also to the mechanical. In the organic development the notion of ends is a necessary criterion of our judgment, since living bodies are *ipso facto* those which form and organize *themselves*, and are consequently inconceivable without the Idea of inherent ends. In the moral development the notion of ends functions as the necessary principle, not only of our judgment, but also of our conduct and the outward manifestations of our character, since the will acts in accordance with ends, and the moral character of its acts is both determined and judged by the moral law. In the moral world ends have *real*, in the organic *ideal*, validity ; in the mechanical world they are to have *no* validity whatever ! According to the doctrine of Kant, there is but *one* time and *one* space, and therefore only *one* sense-world, or one universal nexus of all phenomena. If, now, some phenomena show themselves to be determined by ends, while others must be teleologically judged, there certainly can be no phenomena that are wholly without end. For the moral development of mankind is also organic, and without its organic-sensuous character it would not be *development* at all ; and organic bodies are material and mechanical as well. Consequently the inorganic bodies also, although they must be explained independently of the notion of ends, cannot yet be without end, else there would be no thorough-going nexus of all phenomena, no unity of the sense-world, no unity of time and of space, under which we do not understand a closed unity in the sense of totality, but a world-unity, as opposed to those numberless independent worlds assumed by Leibnitz, and still accepted by Kant in his first studies—then, however, reckoned, together with the *Monadology*, among “the legends from the Utopia of Metaphysics.”

Our view of the world advances from the lifeless realm to the living, and from the living to the moral. That is, it sees how the

organic world evolves from the inorganic, how humanity and the moral world evolve from the organic world, how it would be disastrous absolutely to deny in the first stadium of world-development the validity of ends, and how in the second the necessary application of the notion of ends must be acknowledged, and, finally, in the third the reality of ends disclosed. But this is not the sense of the Kantian doctrine. It denies not the validity of ends, but their theoretical or scientific knowableness in both the inorganic and organic worlds. It affirms their knowableness in the moral world, because here the activity of ends is immediately apparent from the will itself. Matter renders ends unknowable; the will, on the contrary, knowable. Ends are immanent causes, but matter is spatial, and, like space, completely external; everything in space exists as externality, and consists in outward relations; hence it contains no sort of *knowable* immanent causes. This is true of phenomena in general; hence of all bodies, even the organic, which oblige us to consider them as controlled by ends, simply because they form, produce, and reproduce themselves, *i. e.*, because they *develop themselves*.

The unity of the world is also the unity of the world-development. Consequently the *end* that reveals itself in the moral order of things and gives them their intelligible meaning must also be recognized as the *principle* that underlies the natural order of things, but presents itself as knowable in no natural phenomena. That end is freedom. Accordingly, we must consider the entire world-development as the *manifestation of freedom*, and the sensible order of the world as the manifestation of the moral. We thus rise to a point of view where the inner nature of things, which ever remains hidden from our knowledge in its exact sense, becomes unveiled, and where the mystery of the world is solved.

3. The World-development as Manifestation of Thing-in-itself.

Thus in the Kantian doctrine of development the two other fundamental disciplines of the critical philosophy—the doctrines of knowledge and freedom, or, what is the same thing, the notions of nature and freedom—unite themselves. The “Critique of Reason” culminates in the teleological point of view, and attains, by carrying this out, a systematic view of the world. The consequences we have drawn stand directly in the line of the Kantian

doctrine, and they are embodied in expressions which in no way ascribe to Kant or force upon him views that he has not himself expressed or sanctioned in his doctrine. He taught both the unity of the world and the development of things, both the ideal validity of design in the organic realm and its real validity in the moral realm, both freedom as the moral end of the world and the intelligible character of freedom, and that intelligible character is identical with thing-in-itself. Adaptation, of whatever sort it may be, consists in the correspondence of a thing with an end or purpose. This presupposes activity toward an end, hence an end-active power and an end-positing faculty—*i. e.*, will and freedom. Such a correspondence is either given in the thing itself and exists in actuality, or it appears to our reason that it must be present. In the one case it is factual and *real*, in the other it is only a necessary idea, and therefore merely *ideal*. *Moral* ends are of the first sort, *organic* or *natural* of the second. Since, now, without end or purpose—*i. e.*, without will or freedom—adaptation in general can neither exist nor be conceived, and all development must be considered as teleological, the latter must be recognized as the manifestation of freedom or of thing-in-itself. In other words, while the world-development consists in the natural and moral orders of things, the second is not merely the highest stage of development of the first, but also its *ground*; the sensible world is not merely the temporal presupposition of the moral, but also its *phenomenon*. In short, the entire world-development or world-order is the manifestation of freedom.

That such is in truth the fact of the matter Kant declared in his doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, and confirmed it in the "Critique of Judgment." He explained that that supersensible substratum of our knowing reason and of all phenomena, "that supersensible upon which we must base nature as phenomenon," is identical with freedom. The literal statement is as follows: "There must, however, be a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible, which underlies nature, with that which the notion of freedom practically contains, and even if the notion of this ground attains neither to a theoretical nor a practical knowledge of the same, and hence possesses no particular sphere, yet it makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one, to that according to the principles of the

other.”¹ “What the notion of freedom practically contains” is, according to Kant, nothing other than final moral end. What is coincident or one with this can only be the moral end itself, for this is only one with itself. When, consequently, “the unity of the supersensible which underlies nature with what the notion of freedom practically contains” is spoken of, that supersensible substratum can be nothing other than the final moral end itself. And when Kant says “there must be a *ground* of that unity,” only the ground of the final moral end can be understood by it; but this is simply and solely *will* or *freedom*. That “supersensible which underlies nature” is, therefore, will or freedom. There is, according to the letter as well as the spirit of Kant’s doctrine, no other issue. Now, of freedom as the final moral end we have no theoretical, but indeed a practical, knowledge. But of freedom as the supersensible substratum of all phenomena we have neither a theoretical nor a practical knowledge—i. e., we can form no sort of an idea of the “ground of the unity of the supersensible which underlies nature, with what the notion of freedom practically contains.” Hence, Kant says there must be such a ground, the nature of which permits us to unite the principles of nature with those of freedom, although we can acquire neither a theoretical nor a practical knowledge of this ground. The unification of nature and freedom consists in the notion of natural freedom or adaptation; and all organic phenomena must be considered and estimated in accordance with this principle as criterion. Of natural necessity or the mechanism of things we have a theoretical knowledge, of moral freedom a practical knowledge, of natural freedom no knowledge at all; that is, will or freedom in nature is unknowable; natural ends or final causes must necessarily be conceived, but they can never be known.

All the phenomena of nature are exertions of force; natural freedom consists in the freedom of power or of ability; it is the freedom of phenomenon, or the phenomenon in its freedom.² Within the natural world this freedom displays itself in self-devel-

¹ Kant: “Kritik der Urtheilskraft,” Introduction, II. (*Vide* “Werke,” vol. vii, p. 14.) *Id.*: “Dialectik der teleologischen Urtheilskraft,” § 78, p. 231. Cf. Fischer: “Gesch. d. n. Philos.,” vol. iv, pp. 397 and 497.

² “Die natürliche Freiheit besteht in der Freiheit der Kraft oder des Könnens, sie ist die Freiheit der Erscheinung oder die Erscheinung in ihrer Freiheit.”

oping bodies—*i. e.*, in such bodies as bring forth, shape and reproduce themselves; these are the *living* phenomena of nature, which we are accordingly obliged to conceive and consider after the principle of objective immanent teleology. The necessity of regarding organic nature in this way was the subject which Kant worked out in his “Critique of Teleological Judgment.”

There is also the free contemplation of things where freedom is not our object or problem, but our *state*—that harmonious condition of our powers of mind which does not seek to investigate and analyze phenomena, but leaves them in their freedom, apprehending them with pure contemplative pleasure. To this our perfectly free attitude of mind, dependent upon or restrained by no interests, there corresponds the free phenomenon—*i. e.*, the phenomenon in its complete freedom. It is the object of our pure pleasure; we pronounce it beautiful or sublime. Upon the principle of such a subjective fitness of phenomena is founded our faculty of æsthetic judgment, which furnished Kant with the theme of his “Critique of the Æsthetic Judgment.” His investigation confined itself to the analysis of our æsthetic judgment, or of our thought in the state of freedom. This needed to be supplemented by a discussion of the correlate of our æsthetic contemplation, namely, *the phenomenon in the state of its freedom*, or by the attempt to establish also the objectivity of æsthetic fitness. This supplementary step was taken by *Schiller*, who, more than any other down to Schopenhauer, furthered and extended the Kantian æsthetics without abandoning the principles of the critical philosophy. If freedom is the highest law of reason, and as such it determine the character of our knowledge, the laws of which (the laws of the understanding) condition the sense-world, then we must necessarily conceive freedom in phenomena also; and phenomenon in its freedom is beauty. Schiller could not have indicated his Kantian standpoint, and at the same time his advance within it, more aptly and more forcibly than he has done in a word in one of those letters to Körner, which give his chief æsthetic ideas in all their freshness. Even these few words show what a profound understanding of the critical philosophy he possessed “Certainly no greater word has yet been spoken by mortal man than the Kantian ‘Determine thyself out of thyself’ (which is at once the content of his whole philosophy), and this other, of the

theoretical philosophy, 'Nature stands under the laws of the understanding.' This great Idea of self-determination is mirrored back to us from certain phenomena of nature, and this we call *beauty*."¹

We shall not now ask whether the Kantian doctrines of knowledge and development conflict with one another or not. In the first, things-in-themselves are absolutely unknowable and absolutely distinguished from phenomena; in the second, on the contrary, the phenomenon of freedom shows itself. With end, will enters the phenomenal world; with will, freedom, intelligible character, or thing-in-itself, and the farther the evolution of things advances, the more distinctly it manifests itself. The world-development is recognized by Kant as the manifestation and ever-increasing revelation of freedom. What in the mechanical world is not at all manifest or completely veiled forces itself already in the organic realm so far to the light that we are not able even perfectly to experience the phenomena of life without the idea of life's inner adaptation to an end, while in the moral sphere it is completely manifest and present. In the organic evolution of the world we take ends into account; in the moral, it is the thing itself.

Yet between the two doctrines, as they shaped themselves in the mind of Kant, there is, in the first place, no contradiction, but a deep underlying harmony. Against the charge that, while the doctrine of knowledge holds things-in-themselves to be forever absolutely hidden, the doctrine of development regards them as increasingly intelligible and knowable, Kant is protected from the outset by his distinction of the sorts of knowledge. To such a stricture he would reply: Things-in-themselves are only so far intelligible as they are *practically* knowable; theoretically knowable they are never. Every phenomenon is, as object of knowledge, a link in the nexus of things; each has in our idea of the world its fixed time and place; none is thinkable without the thing-in-itself which underlies them all; in none is this thing-in-itself knowable, it nowhere appears—*i. e.*, it never so ap-

¹ Schiller's "Briefwechsel mit Körner," 2d ed., edited by Carl Goedeke, 1878. Letter of the 18th of February, 1793, pp. 18–19. The letters referred to above are the following five, written in Jena, that of January 25th, and those of the 8th, 18th, 23d, and 28th of February, 1793. *Vide* pp. 5–51.

pears that we could come across it in our knowledge and say, "There it is!" In order to know a phenomenon we must analyze and dissect it, resolve it into its knowable factors, and then from these construct our knowledge of it. Among such factors the thing-in-itself, the creative or originaive ground of being of all phenomena, is not to be found. This does not appear, because it is the cause of appearance; nor does it show itself, either, in the evolution of things, since it does not exhaust itself in any one form or stage of development, nor consist in any transition. It can *re-reveal* itself, but not *appear*. It becomes manifest, yet ever remains hidden, like disposition in conduct, the genius of the artist in his work, the will to live or the inherent end of life in the organism, force in its exertion, God in the world. For something to appear means, in the exact sense of the word, that it is contained in an object in such a way that in the analysis of the object it will be hit upon and found. Now, even the most searching analysis of any phenomenon is not able to discover the ground *why* and *to what end* it is—*i. e.*, to discover its innermost being. To be sure, one need not necessarily trouble himself with this question, and, indeed, in experimental knowledge and the so-called exact sciences, he is authorized to pay no heed to it whatever. One may also, if he choose, banish it completely from thought, as an idle question. But this the profound thinkers among philosophers, those upon whom the mystery of the world rests as a burden, can never do. Thus the Kantian distinction of things-in-themselves from phenomena, as well as its doctrine of the unknowableness of the former in the way of the scientific analysis of the latter, retains its deep and abiding meaning.

The question concerning the thing-in-itself as the ground of being of all phenomena carries us back to the *original ground* of things. This, according to Kant, becomes intelligible to us from no phenomenon, of whatever sort it may be, but solely from the final end of the world—*i. e.*, from the end which our reason, by means of its freedom from the world we conceive (sense-world), posits for itself, and realizes through the purification of the will. In this sense man may be recognized as the final end of the world. "Thus it is only the appetitive faculty, but not that which makes man dependent (through sensuous impulses) upon nature; not that in respect to which the worth of his existence de-

pend upon what he receives and enjoys, but the worth which he can give to himself and which consists in what he does, how and according to what principles he acts; not as a part of nature, but in the *freedom* of his appetitive faculties—that is, a *good will* is that whereby alone his existence can have an absolute worth, and in relation to which the existence of the world can have a final end.”¹ Our philosopher judges like our poet: “Enjoyment debases”; “The deed is everything, nothing the fame.”² With this confession Goethe’s “Faust” rises to the point of its highest morality.

If the end of our existence were mere happiness, or that enjoyment of the world which consists in continual amusement, if we came into the world only in order, like the man in the farce, to make a “joke” of ourselves, and to seek unmixed pleasure, it would seem that modern pessimism, inspired as it is by the pleasure-seeking of our day, is right in declaring that this object of life has proved a failure, and that it is the opposite goal that has been reached, inasmuch as the sum of pleasure is in reality far less than the sum of pain, and *ennui* far more prevalent than amusement. Then the result of life, as that of the buffoonery, would be truly a most sad “joke.” Nothing is more foolish and wanting in all genuine knowledge of man than this sort of a debit-and-credit account of pleasure and pain, of joy and sorrow, as if they could be added and subtracted like money, and the sum of life figured out by this childish example. The pessimism and optimism of the ordinary sort stand upon precisely the same plane; both are *eudemonistic*, and hold happiness to be the only desirable good. The pessimists, on the one hand, find the world so ill-conditioned that we can never attain and enjoy this good, but only and ever chase after it with unsatisfied craving, so that we are thus condemned to a continual Tantalus-torment, to the most intense misery conceivable. The optimists, on the other hand, find the world and the human mind so beneficently planned that, with the right knowledge and a corresponding regulation of conduct, we are able to bring about the perfectly happy state of life.

¹ Kant: “Kritik der Urtheilskraft,” § 86. (*Vide* “Werke,” vol. vii, p. 326.)

² “Geniessen macht gemein.” “Die That ist alles, nichts der Ruhm!” “Faust,” Part II, Act IV, § 1.

As people are busying themselves a good deal nowadays with Kant, there is naturally considerable dispute, this way and that, as to whether his teachings are to be taken in the sense of a pessimistic or an optimistic view of life. But the simple fact that such a question is debated, as answerable by yes or no, shows sufficiently well how little Kant is understood. His doctrine is neither the one nor the other, since it does not judge of the object of life eudemonistically at all. Were this object the happiness which we necessarily craved, according to the sensuous impulses of our nature, such a state of well-being, even if it could be fully attained, would leave our moral nature empty and unsatisfied, since we should thereby utterly fail of the *truly human* or *personal* end of life, which cannot be given to us, but only posited—*i. e.*, *willed* by ourselves. The end of human existence in the world consists in man's *moral self-development*, which comprehends culture as well and all its wide interests, and which in its very nature is an unceasing and endless progress. Every solved problem presents new problems for solution. Here there is no idle bliss, which we are to enjoy with folded hands, no moment of complete contentment; yet all contentment worthy of man is only to be found in the way of this free self-development. Indeed, it is not to be *found*, but *won*: "Only he earns freedom as well as life who daily has to win it!" Contentment lies in no one moment, but in the entire fulness of life, in both the joys and sorrows of creating. He who traverses this path is free from the attacks of the monster *Care*, who robs man of life's every gratifying enjoyment; moral energy alone she cannot stay: that she merely intensifies. Of the end and worth of human life Kant judged at the close of his teleological view of the world, as Goethe at the end of "*Faust*." It needed no magic to free man from care and the world's spirits of torment:

"Im *Weiterschreiten* find' er *Qual und Glück*,
Er, unbefriedigt jeden Augenblick!"¹

The goal of our moral self-development is freedom *from* the world. If "man under moral laws" is recognized as the final

¹ "In marching onward, bliss and torment find,
Though, every moment, with unsated mind!"

(Taylor's translation.)

"Faust," Part II, Act V, Scene 5.

end of the world, then these laws must be recognized as world-laws, and the moral order of the world as the order of all things; then there must be also a moral author of the world, or an *original ground* of all things, who can be no other being than the world-creating will or God. Thus Kant's teleological view of the world culminates in the moral theology which furnishes the basis for the only valid demonstration of the existence of God, whose reality Kant never doubted, whose theoretical demonstrability he denied and disproved in his doctrine of knowledge, whose existence he affirmed with complete certitude in his doctrine of freedom and faith. Without will as the original ground of the world, there is in the latter neither freedom, nor final end, nor development.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

B. Preliminary Questions.

Before proceeding to the discourse on our subject proper, it seems indispensable to settle some preliminary questions, or rather to institute an inquiry into them, with the understanding that it shall depend upon the results of it whether any such discourse, [that is to say] any rational cognition of religion, be possible. An inquiry into these questions and an answer to them seem indispensably necessary, since they have pre-eminently occupied the philosophical and popular interest of contemporaneous thought, and because they concern the fundamental principles of the present public sentiment regarding religious doctrines and their cognition. If we should omit such inquiry, it would at least be necessary to show that this omission is not accidental, and that it has its justification in the fact that the essential part of such inquiry is not a preliminary question, but belongs to our science itself, within which all these questions shall find their solution.

Hence we shall here consider those obstacles only with which the learning and the sentiment of our times has opposed the right of trying to comprehend religion through reason.